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Introduction
In many European countries, a high proportion of immigrants from low and middle income countries and their dependent children reside in less-privileged neighbourhoods of the larger cities. Such a spatial concentration -where the physical distance between neighbourhoods functions as a barrier -is often seen as obstacle in the integration process into the host society. For children, residential segregation signifies socialisation into certain social settings which probably yield long-run consequences. As the consequence of residential segregation between recently arrived immigrants (and other deprived groups) and the majority, a polarisation of living conditions can arise, a polarisation that can foster social tensions and unrest.
In this paper we present an empirical study of the extent and changes of residential economic polarisation and ethnic polarisation in the country of Sweden. Sweden has long been known for its equal distribution of income and its ambitious social programs. However, the large economic downturn which took place in the beginning of the 90s led to widespread joblessness from which the labour force participation rate has not fully recovered. The trend of increasing earnings and income inequality that started during the first part of the 80s has continued. Housing policies have been dismantled. Together, these processes have increased residential polarisation. Concurrently, the fact, that the immigrants have been concentrated to metropolitan regions -especially to their less attractive areas, has begun to draw the public attention. Residential segregation, economic as well as ethnic, has been placed on the political agenda. For the first time ever, a metropolitan policy for Sweden was formalised in 1998. 1 This policy consists of programs aimed at supporting disadvantaged areas. (Andersson, 2006) Although there have been attempts to counteract residential segregation in Sweden, relatively few systematic efforts (in contrast to the US, for instance) have been made to measure the changes in and reasons for residential segregation.
2 This paper is an attempt to shed new light 1 Ministry of Finance (1998). 2 Janson (1987) studied residential segregation (defined as the difference in residential patterns between Social Democratic party voters, i.e. the working class, and the total population) in the three metropolitan areas of Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö from 1936 to 1976 . The probably first study on ethnic segregation in Greater Stockholm showed that that residential segregation varies in scale among different immigrant groups (Andersson-Brolin, 1984) . Biterman (1994) examined economic segregation between low and high income earners and ethnic segregation between native born residents, immigrants from European countries and immigrants from non-European countries in the Stockholm region during 1970 Stockholm region during -1985 . Such a rank order of on these issues. We apply a division of metropolitan regions into neighbourhoods which are used as a building block when investigating residential polarisation in each of Sweden's three metropolitan areas. We derive results for 1990, 1996 and 2002 , making it possible to show changes over time. Further, we link mean income at the neighbourhood level to education and other household characteristics in order to understand reasons for the changes.
According to various explanatory models for why segregation arises, 3 residential segregation can be seen both as an outcome of individual decisions -voluntary and involuntary -as well as decisions at the policy level. Most often, residential segregation between population groups is defined as their respectively uneven distribution across subunits (here neighbourhoods) of the city, 4 which results in various groups within society not sharing physical and/or social space. People in urban areas tend to arrange themselves in accordance with their particular characteristics in terms of socioeconomic or ethnic status, religion, lifestyle or other cultural
properties. The income gaps between population groups are especially important in this process. In our societies, segregation is associated with such negative phenomena as dissimilarities, fragmentation, distance and conflict, for individual households as for the whole society.
This discussion addressing segregation issues deals primarily with adults´ preferences, choices and decisions. The perspective of children is often not present, though the strongest argument concerning residential segregation should take their situation into account. Children are typically not the primary decision-makers regarding household choice of residency though one could argue that the location where they grow up is a significant aspect of their childhood and might affect their future life. In the political tradition of Western countries, equality in opportunities for children -included small differences in residential pattern -is considered desirable. However, the segregation studies where children are primary target are few. That immigrant groups after degree of segregation has been confirmed by other studies (Andersen, 2001; Bevelander, Carlssson & Rojas, 1997, Ministry of Health and Social Affairs 1997) . Some studies have noted a decline in segregation in certain respects. A study by the Swedish National Integration Office of ethnic residential segregation in the three metropolitan areas and in six medium-sized Swedish municipalities during the period [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] showed that the segregation trend is not uniform. Segregation has declined in Malmö, for instance, but has remained largely unchanged in Stockholm and Göteborg in latest years (National Integration Office, 2004 , 2005 . Biterman and Franzén (2007) showed significant increase in ethnic but not in economic segregation since 1990. 3 See Huttman, Blaw, and Saltman J, eds. (1991) . 4 See for example Allison (1978) or White (1986) .
motivates us to study residential segregation from the perspective of children, concentrating on income gap across neighbourhoods, which we name "polarisation".
Our target variable is "child income", a variable based on the disposable income and the expenditure needs of the child's family. Applying an additively decomposable income index to income tax data, we define economic polarisation as the proportion of inequality in child income in a particular region that can be attributed to differences in mean income across neighbourhoods. That is, in the operationalization use of the concept "polarization" we follow Zhang and Kanbur (2001) , remembering that there are also other measures of the concept (see for example Estaban and Rao, 1994 and Wolfson, 1994) . As a first research question we examine how large a part of the inequality in child income in each of the three regions is due to inequality across neighbourhoods and how this spatial polarisation has changed.
Our second research task is to investigate ethnic polarisation and the link between spatial polarisation and ethnic segregation. We claim that it is relevant to cluster neighbourhoods according to level of concentration of visible minorities. 5 Our question is: How large proportion of inequality in child income can be attributed to the level of concentration of visible minorities in the diverse clusters of neighbourhoods and how has such a proportion changed? Related to this, we ask for the overlap between economic and ethic polarisation.
Finally, we aim to better understand why differences in neighbourhoods´ mean child income are so much greater in 2002 than in 1990. Using regressions we investigate the roles played by parental education and other household characteristics and their payoffs.
In the paper we confirm that mean child income changed little between 1990 and 1996, while larger increases took place from 1996 to 2002. During the period studied, inequality in child income increased profoundly. At the neighbourhood level there is considerable mobility across years in average child income, which means that while some neighbourhoods had gained positions in the ranking of neighbourhoods, others lost. A major finding is that in all regions and between all years of investigation, residential economic polarisation has increased. For example, using the Mean Logarithmic Deviation we find that while in the Stockholm region 7 percent of inequality in child income in 1990 was due to differences in 5 i.e. those whose appearance and/or behaviour is perceived as foreign by the majority of the population.
average income across neighbourhoods, the corresponding proportion (of a higher inequality value) had increased to 16 percent in 1995 and to as much as 22 percent in 2002.
We also show that ethnic polarisation has increased in all three metropolitan regions. Most remarkably, while mean child income in neighbourhoods with few or no visible minorities was much higher in 2002 than in 1990, mean income remained more or less constant in neighbourhoods where a high share of residents are visible minorities. We report a relatively large overlap between economic and ethnic polarisation. Finally we find that increased returns to parental education are a major factor leading to larger economic polarisation among children in Swedish metropolitan regions.
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows: In the next section we introduce the building block of neighbourhood used in this study, while the central concepts of child income, its inequality and polarisation are defined in Section 3. Results on the extent of spatial polarisation and its change are reported in Section 4 while Section 5 contains results on ethnic polarisation. In Section 6 we investigate the changed relation between parental education and other household characteristics and mean child income at the neighbourhood level. The paper ends with a concluding section.
Neighbourhoods in the three major urban regions of Sweden
In all empirical studies of residential segregation, the choice of primary spatial unit is central review -a great advantage while studying segregation processes (see Biterman and Franzén, 2007) .
The Neighbourhood is defined as a built-up area that:
-is demarcated by "natural borders" (larger streets, green areas, etc).
-corresponds to a city district or a residential area.
-possesses a number of inhabitants large enough to provide a basis for certain private or public services.
-can be considered as an "area of identification" by its inhabitants.
A geographical division into neighbourhoods in accordance with these criteria has only been established for the metropolitan regions, i.e. municipalities of Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö with neighbouring, suburb municipalities 7 , see Table 1 .
/ Table 1 There are more differences across regions regarding country of origin, a variation that to some extent mirrors the varying geographic distance to sender countries. Finland is the largest sender country of immigrants living in the Stockholm region and ranks number two among sender countries to the Göteborg region, but has a much lower ranking in the Malmö region.
In contrast, Poland is the second largest sender country for immigrants living in the Malmö region, but ranks much lower in the other two regions. If Yugoslavia and its successor states are considered to be one unit, it is the single largest sender of immigrants living in the Göteborg and Malmö regions. Iraq ranks high as a sender country for all three regions (number two in the Stockholm region, number four in the Göteborg region and number three in the Malmö region). Other highly ranked sender countries are Iran (particularly in the Göteborg region) and Turkey (particularly in the Stockholm region). In the Swedish context it is generally perceived that various forms of discrimination and social exclusion are social problems for some, but not all, foreign born. For reasons discussed in Section 5 we will therefore distinguish between visible immigrants and other immigrants.
Defining child income; its inequality and polarisation.
From the various perspectives of residential segregation possible to analyse, this paper uses the economic situation of children, and we make comparisons within the population of children. 8 We define a child as a person under age 18 and measure his or her economic situation based on the disposable income of the parents. An important component of a 8 The alternative of making income comparisons among all individuals, and not only children, as reference would probably not have much affected the picture here reported. This, as mean disposable equivalent income for children in Sweden typically is found to bee relatively close to mean disposable income for the entire population. For example Gustafsson, Johansson and Palmer (2003) report, based on the Household Income Survey, and a chosen equivalence scale, that during the period 1991 to 1998 average disposable child income was around 10 percent lower than average disposable income for the entire population.
household's disposable income is wages subject to income tax. In addition, there can be income from capital received as dividends and interest as well as income from capital gains from selling stocks and property. Tax files provide this information delivered to Statistics
Sweden. We work with data on all children, not a sample.
Other income components we add to receive "gross income" are receipt of social insurance benefits (sickness benefits and unemployment compensation, for example) and transfers such as child allowances, housing benefits and social assistance. Statistics Sweden obtains this information from various registers kept by the authorities paying the transfers. Statistics
Sweden also obtains information from the tax authority on income taxes paid by the households and after subtracting this component from gross income, the disposable income is obtained. We derive our target variable "child income" by adjusting the disposable income of each household with children with an equivalence scale used by Statistics Sweden. 9 In a final step, each person under 18 is assigned this income and we perform the analysis of child income using individuals (children) as the unit of analysis.
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Some measurement problems make our measure of child income somewhat noisy. As is the case for all studies based on tax data, undeclared earnings and capital income are not covered in the data; it is difficult to have a well-based view of how important such underreporting is.
While there are thus reasons to expect child income to be underestimated in some cases, there are reasons to expect it to have been overestimated in others. The latter occurs as we work with a narrow income pooling and need unit. In any particular case we do not know whether the real income-sharing unit also includes one or more persons over 18 years of age; a person that is not the father or mother of the child. Probably the largest category of such persons consists of older siblings living with the parents. Typically such persons are non-workers signifying low personal income while adding to the real expenditure needs of the family.
In order to quantify economic polarisation we decompose inequality in child income across neighbourhoods. We use two additively decomposable inequality indices, namely the Theil index defined as: where ng is the number of individuals in the gth group (neighbourhoods), Ig inequality within the gth group, µ g the mean of the gth group income, and e g the n g vector of ones.
Within this framework we define residential economic polarisation as the ratio between between-group income inequality and total income inequality, a measure which by definition ranges from 0 to 1.
11 The "between-group" part represents the inequality that would vanish if mean income of all neighbourhoods were to be equally large. In a similar manner we define residential ethnic polarisation based on a classification of clusters of neighbourhoods formed after ethnic composition. Details on this classification are provided in Section 5.
The measures of residential and ethnic polarisation (for each metropolitan region) are related which can be seen from the following identities:
Total income inequality =
Within neighbourhood inequality + Between neighbourhood inequality (1)
Between neighbourhood inequality =
Between ethnic cluster inequality + Within ethnic cluster inequality
Substituting (1) into (2) we arrive at:
Total income inequality = Within neighbourhood inequality + Between cluster inequality + Within ethnic cluster inequality
The relative sizes of the two sign terms on the right provide an indication of the overlap between residential segregation and economic segregation. We can for example define a measure of overlap as:
Between ethnic cluster inequality / Between neighbourhood inequality
By definition the ratio defined in equation (4) assumes values from 0, as is the case if there is no ethnic segregation, up to 1.0 (or 100 percent) which is the case if economic and ethnic segregation strictly follow each other.
To repeat: The tax data we work with contain all individuals and households living in the three regions studied. Thus there are no sample errors in our numbers. The database at our disposal , the Social Medicine Database from Centre for Epidemiology at The National Board of Health and Welfare, contains annual data from 1990 to 2002. We chose to make computations for the first and last years and also include computations for 1996 which makes it possible to investigate changes across two six-year sub-periods. Of the two, the first is characterised by some economic growth initially followed by a deep downturn of the economy, while the latter sub-period was a period of rapid recovery.
The extent of spatial polarisation and its change
/ Table 2 about here/ Table A1 in the Appendix provides an overview of development of child income in 2002 for the three regions combined and which refers to the 652 000 children living there. It can be seen that mean child income in 1996 was only 4 percent higher than in 1990, but between 1996 and 2002 it had increased by as much as 28 percent. Further, inequality in child income increased between both pairs of years according to all inequality measures computed. Table 2 shows example of neighbourhoods as we present the six neighbourhoods with lowest and / Table 3 about here / Table 3 reports mean child income and income inequality using the additively decomposable indices and for comparison, the Gini coefficient for each of the three regions. We also decompose inequality in child income for the combined three regions by metropolitan region (the lower part of the table). Stockholm has the highest mean child income and the gap to the other two regions has widened slightly. This development becomes visible when we decompose inequality in the combined three regions by region (the lower rows of Table 3 ), as larger fractions can be attributed to the between region part. Still very little of the inequality in child income in the three regions combined is due to differences in mean income across regions; for 2002 less than 2 percent. With this background we now look at mean income at the level of neighbourhood. Figure 1 shows that the distribution of mean child neighbourhood income in 2002 has moved to the right and is more unequal than that of 1990. During the 12 year period studied here, few dwellings were constructed or renovated and changes in the physical structure of the neighbourhoods were relatively minor, particularly during the first part of the period as the construction industry had almost collapsed. However, demographic events led to many changes in the composition of the studied population in the neighbourhoods. More than half of the children observed at the beginning of the period left the population as they became adults. They were replaced by newborns. In addition, many parents and their children moved out of their neighbourhoods to other destination in the same region, another region or another country. There was also mobility into the regions from other parts of the country as well as from abroad. With this background in mind, we understand why we can observe a considerable mobility of neighbourhoods in the distribution of child income across the years.
/ Table 4 about here/ Table 4 shows the extent of mobility of neighbourhoods in the distribution of child income in the Stockholm region as a matrix. We have classified neighbourhoods into deciles for each year and show the association as percentages of units observed the first year. We see that slightly more than half of the neighbourhoods located in the bottom decile in 1990 remained in the same decile in 2002. Mobility is even larger in the middle of the distribution where a relatively small change in mean child income can cause the neighbourhood to change deciles.
Most stability is found at the top of the distribution, although actually one-third of the neighbourhoods that were at the top in 1990 had moved down one or two deciles. While clearly neighbourhood mobility most often is short, Table 3 reports a few cases with long distance mobility. For example, one neighbourhood moved from the first decile in 1990 to the ninth in 2002 while another moved from the ninth decile down to the first.
/ Table 5 about here/
We are now in a position to answer the first research question, that of the extent and changes in residential economic polarisation. here the rate of social assistance receipt fell from 6 to 2 percent.
Ethnicity and polarisation
In order to study the degree of ethnic polarisation we classify neighbourhoods by the ethnic composition of its population. Such a classification can obviously be made using various criteria. Here we apply a criterion based on the rate between the number of visible immigrants born (of all ages) and the number of native born (of all ages). In the Swedish context it is generally perceived that various forms of discrimination and social exclusion are social For each of the eight clusters of neighbourhoods defined in this manner as well as for the category of unclassified, we compute mean child income and inequality in child income.
Based on these numbers we decompose child inequality to show the extent of ethnic polarisation and its changes. The results are presented in the Appendix Table A2 . While there is not much of a pattern of differences in child income inequality across ethnic categories, more is found regarding mean income as well as changes in mean income. Not surprisingly, the highest mean incomes are found in neighbourhoods with few visible foreign born residents while the mean incomes are slightly lower in the clusters of neighbourhoods with 12 See Biterman and Franzén (2007) for the exact definition. It is to some extent arbitrary where to place the dividing line between visible and non-visible immigrants. Here people born in Hungary, Russia and Romania (together with those from for example Finland, Norway, Germany and United States) for example, are not considered visible immigrants. This in contrast to persons born in Yugoslavia (and its successor countries), Bulgaria, Greece, Spain and Italy who are considered visible immigrants (together with people from Africa, Africa and Latin America). Nevertheless, we can argue that all immigrants from countries in dispute comprise no more than 6-7 per cent of all non-visible immigrants, according to this categorisation. If we categorised them as "visible" instead, it would not change the clustering of neighbourhoods in some profound way, nor have some impact on the final results and conclusions. Another potential limitation of the definition is that it is based only on people who are born outside Sweden. Thus it does not take into consideration that some second generation immigrants are visible different from the majority. / Table 6 about here/ Finally, we study the overlap between residential economic and ethnic polarisation using the definition spelled out in Section 3. Table 6 provides the numbers. The table shows that the overlap has actually changed differently over time in the three metropolitan areas. In the Stockholm region, the overlap decreased during the first sub-period, and then remained constant. In contrast, the overlap increased between each pair of years in the two other metropolitan areas. The Malmö region in 2002 stands out as having the highest overlap. / Table 8 about here/
Understanding differences in mean child neighbourhood income
The intercept in Table 8 indicates the mean child income of a neighbourhood in the Stockholm metropolitan region where all children have two parents with strong labour market attachments and long university educations; no child is foreign born. The two models predict that (in case mother's average age at child birth is 30 and the child lives in Stockholm), mean child income in 2002 to be as much as 49 percent higher than in 1990. In contrast, if both parents have educations not higher than at the compulsory level, mean child income is predicted to have decreased by 11 percent.
In addition to the strongly changed effects of parental education, the estimates show positive coefficients for mothers age at first child birth as well as negative coefficients estimated with to predict changes in mean child neighbourhood income in Figure 5 , the picture becomes rather different. Almost without exception, neighbourhood child income is predicted to have increased; for a substantial proportion of neighbourhoods, the increase is more than 33 percent. Further, there is a strong positive linear relation between initial income level and income change. Changes in coefficients are thus the major driving force behind the increase in spatial polarisation in child income across neighbourhoods in Swedish metropolitan areas.
When understanding these results it is useful to remember that child income is the sum of several income components: Wages of parents received during a full year, dividends, interests, capital gains as well as various transfers and with income taxes enter with a negative 13 When analysing residuals we notice that the model significantly underpredicts mean neighbourhood income for the three neighbourhoods with the highest mean incomes in both year 1990 and year 2002.
sign. Increased coefficients are thus most likely the outcome of several changes. One possible channel is increased rates to return to education in the labour market that has previously been documented. 14 In addition Sweden experienced a tax reform during the period studied. Its components were decreased marginal tax rates as well as the introduction of two tax bases, not as previously one. As a consequence capital gains and interests are now subject to a proportional tax rate of 30 percent. In the old system such incomes were added to earnings and when earned by an average or higher paid person taxed at a high rate. The tax reform is thus an additional possible reason why coefficients have increased.
Conclusions
In this paper we have studied economic and ethnic segregation in the three metropolitan regions of Sweden from the perspective of children, using a new operationalization of the neighbourhood concept. Neighbourhoods were clustered according to rate of visible immigrants. The target variable under study was child income computed from the income of parents and considers the expenditure needs of the family in which the child lives. Inequality in child income 1990, 1996 and 2002 was studied by decomposing additively decomposable inequality indexes. Based on this, measures of residential economic polarisation and residential ethnic polarisation were obtained, as well as the overlap between economic and ethnic polarisation. In our approach, residential polarisation is a characteristic not only attributed to neighbourhoods with low incomes, but also to neighbourhoods with high incomes. Further, we studied the relation between parental income, some other household characteristics and mean child neighbourhood income in 1990 and 2002 using regression analysis. These estimates provided the basis for simulations illustrating the importance of changes in variables and in coefficients.
A major finding is that in all three metropolitan areas and for both sub-periods studied, residential polarisation increased. For example, while in the Stockholm region 7 percent of inequality (measured by the MLD index) in child income in 1990 was due to differences in mean income across neighbourhoods, the corresponding proportion of the now larger inequality had increased to 16 percent in 1996 and to as much as 22 percent in 2002.
14 See Gustavsson (2006) who analysed wages in Sweden 1992 to 2001 by estimating wage functions.
The study has found that ethnic residential polarisation increased as well across both subperiods studied in all three cities. Most strikingly we found that mean real income had increased rapidly from 1990 to 2002 in clusters with predominantly Swedish born population.
In contrast, mean child income in clusters where many visible foreign born live had not grown. We report a relatively large overlap between economic and ethnic polarisation.
Finally, based on analysing data for neighbourhoods we have found that increased returns to parental variables, mot prominently education, are a major factor leading to larger economic segregation among children in Swedish metropolitan regions. Changes in parental variables contributed less. For example we found that children having two parents with long university educations have a much higher income in 2002 than in 1990. In contrast, during the same twelve years, children with two parents who possess only compulsory educations experienced a slight decrease in child income.
While the overall picture for the three metropolitan areas studied is the same, some differences should be noted. While inequality in child income continued to increase during the second sub-period in the Stockholm region, this was not the case in the other two regions.
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